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his land he may demand a "reasonable price"29 or "just compensation." 0
James A. Hobbs
MINERAL RIGHTS-RIGHT TO PARTITION-SERVITUDES CREATED

BY RESERVATION IN SALE OF LAND

Defendant bought a 4000 acre tract of land, the vendor retaining one-half of the minerals. The plaintiff then bought the vendor's interest and brought suit against defendant for partition,
claiming that, as owner of one-half of the minerals, he was a
co-owner with the defendant. Held, that the plaintiff owned a
complete servitude, an entire right to explore on the defendant's
land and to retain one-half of the minerals extracted, and therefore he was not entitled to partition. Starr Davis Oil Company
v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906 (1950).
There is no question as to the nature of this servitude which
the plaintiff owned. The courts have repeatedly held that a sale
or reservation of the minerals in a tract of land constitutes a sale
or reservation of a right to go upon all parts of the land and to
explore for minerals and to retain the amount stipulated in the
contract.'
At the time of the sale and until minerals are actually produced from the land, there is nothing which can be the subject
of ownership by this conveyance except a right of search, with
the right to keep half of the minerals, if and when found. It is
only this right of search with which we are concerned in this
attempt to partition.
2
Before there can be a partition there must be co-ownership.
Land held by co-owners may be partitioned8 either in kind or by
29. 33 U.S.C.A. § 702d (1950).

30. 33 U.S.C.A. § 595 (1950); U. S. Const., Amend. V.
1. Rives v. Gulf Refining Co., 133 La. 178, 62 So. 623 (1913).

See also

Palmer Corp. v. Moore, 171 La. 774, 132 So. 229 (1930), and list of cases there.
For a more recent case see Standard Oil Co. v. Futral, 204 La. 215, 15 So. 2d
65 (1943).
2. See Daggett, Mineral Rights in Louisiana 230-46 (1949).
3. Art. 1289, La. Civil Code of 1870: "No one can be compelled to hold

property with another, unless the contrary has been agreed upon; anyone has
a right to demand the division of a thing held in common, by the action of
partition."
Art. 1308: "The action of partition will not only lie between co-heirs and
co-legatees, but between all persons who hold property in common, from

whatever cause they may hold in common."
Art. 1311: "Partitions can be sued for not only by the majority of heirs,
but by each of them, so that one heir alone can force all the rest to partition
at his instance."
Moreover, co-owners of land cannot explore for minerals on the common
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NOTES

licitation. 4 There seems to be no reason why a servitude owned
by two or more persons may not be partitioned by licitation. 5
However, the facts of this case are not in any way like the
above situations of co-ownership since the plaintiff by himself
had a complete right to go upon the defendant's land to explore.
Article 656 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 18706 makes impossible
the ownership of only a part of the "rights of servitudes." Each
owner of a servitude on the same tract of land has, in fact, a complete right to exercise the same privileges. 7 Therefore, since the
plaintiff in this case had the complete right to go on the defendant's land to explore, he cannot be said to have been a co-owner.
"The theory of partition is between the owners of the thing held
'incommon'." s Therefore, how can something not held in common, owned in its entirety by only one person, be the subject of
an action to partition? 9
The holding in this case is entirely consistent with the prior
jurisprudence which has developed in regard to mineral servitudes. The plaintiff erred in contending that there was a limitaland without the consent of the other co-owners, and therefore, one co-owner
cannot alone confer a complete right to explore. See Gulf Refining Co. v.
Carroll, 145 La. 299, 82 So. 277 (1919); Art. 738, La. Civil Code of 1870: "The
coproprietor of an undivided estate can not impose a servitude thereon,
without the consent of his coproprietor.
"The contract of servitude, however, is not null; its execution is suspended until the consent of the coproprietor is given."

However, the servitude owner has a remedy in being able to force his
vendor to partition the common land, under Art. 740, La. Civil Code of 1870:
"If the coproprietor has established the servitude for his part of the estate
only, the consent of the other owners is not necessary, but the exercise of the
servitude must be suspended, until his part be ascertained by a partition. In
this case, he to whom the servitude has been granted, may compel the coproprietor from whom he received it, to sue for a partition, or may sue for it
himself."
4. Art. 1339, La. Civil Code of 1870: "When the property is indivisible by
its nature, or when it can not be conveniently divided, the judge shall order,
at the instance of any one of the heirs, on proof of either of these facts, that
it shall be sold at public auction, after the time of notice and advertisements
prescribed by law, and in the manner hereinafter prescribed."
See also Gulf Refining Co. v. Hayne, 138 La. 555, 70 So. 509 (1915); Sellwood v. Phillips, 185 La. 1045, 171 So. 440 (1936).
5. Art. 1289, La. Civil Code of 1870, supra note 3. See Daggett, op. cit.
supra note 2, at § 56.
6. Art. 656: "The rights of servitudes, considered in themselves, are not
susceptible of division, either real or imaginary. It is impossible that an
estate should have upon another estate part of a right of way, or of view, or
any other right of servitude, and also that an estate be charged with a part
of a servitude.
"The use of a right of servitude may be limited to certain days or hours;
but thus limited, it is an entire right, and not part of a right."
7. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
8. Daggett, op. cit. supra note 2, at 240. See also Arts. 1289, 1308 and
1311, La. Civil Code of 1870, quoted supra at note 3.
9. Clark v. Tensas Delta Land Co., 172 La. 913, 136 So. 1 (1931).
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tion on his right to explore inasmuch as the defendant landowner
could "exercise the identical right."'10 The error is one that could
easily have been avoided had the nature of the servitude owned
by the plaintiff been kept in mind. This servitude should have
been distinguished from the right also owned by the plaintiff to
retain one-half of any minerals extracted from the defendant's
land. The error of failing to recognize this distinction led the
plaintiff to believe that he held a right in common with the defendant, subject to partition, while in reality each held a complete
right to explore the entire tract of land, and each had a right to
one-half of the benefits of this exploration.
William W. Bell, Jr.
NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE-STATE
TAXATION OF INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION

Connecticut sought to impose an apportioned net income tax,
applicable to all corporations, on the Spector Motor Service.
Spector, a Missouri corporation, was engaged in exclusively interstate trucking. It was authorized by the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Connecticut Public Utilities Commission to
do interstate trucking, but was not licensed by Connecticut to do
and did not do intrastate trucking. Although full truckload shipments were loaded directly into the interstate carrier, two terminals were operated in the state, wherein small shipments were
assembled into truckloads. Spector employed twenty-seven fulltime employees in Connecticut, with a payroll in excess of
$1,200.00 a week. Held, unconstitutional. A state cannot levy a
net income tax on an exclusively interstate transportation company, regardless of apportionment. Spector Motor Service, Incorporated v. O'Connor, 71 S. Ct. 508 (U.S. 1951).
The instant case, in effect, overrules the Memphis' and Interstate Pipe Line2 cases, the continued validity of which was questionable after the passing of Justices Rutledge and Murphy. The
Memphis case held an apportioned franchise tax valid on a pipe
line company which under the decision had no intrastate activity.
The Interstate case sustained a gross receipts tax on a pipe line;
the tax was self-apportioning, since all of the line was within
Mississippi. The opinion of the court held that it was immaterial
whether the company was engaged in interstate commerce or not.
10. Starr Davis Oil Co. v. Webber, 218 La. 231, 48 So. 2d 906, 907 (1950).
1. Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948).
2. Interstate Oil Pipe Line Co. v. Stone, 337 U.S. 662 (1949).

